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Abstract
This paper examines the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and
workforce participation in an occupational choice model with a household sector and
endogenous female labor supply. Gender gaps in workforce participation have a direct
negative effect on market, while gender gaps in entrepreneurship affect negatively mar-
ket output not only by reducingwages and labor force participation but also by reducing
the average talent of entrepreneurs and aggregate productivity. We estimate the effects
of these gender gaps for 37 European countries, as well as the United States, and find
that gender gaps cause an average loss of 17.5% inmarket output and 13.2% in total out-
put, which also includes household output. Interestingly, the total output loss would
be similar (12%) in a model without household sector, since the market output loss is
larger when the female labor supply is endogenous. Eastern Europe is the region with
lowest income fall due to gender gaps, while Southern Europe is the region with the
largest fall. Northern Europe is the region with the largest productivity fall, which is
due to the presence of high gender gaps in entrepreneurship.
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1 Introduction
Gender inequality is present inmany socioeconomic indicators around theworld in both
developed and developing countries.1 In this paper, we study two important aspects of
gender inequality in the labor market, namely the low female participation in the labor
market and the low presence of women in entrepreneurial activities. Worldwide, women
are underrepresented in the labor market, but this is especially the case in entrepreneurial
occupations like employers and self-employed workers. Our focus is on Europe, where the
female-to-male ratio is between 0.76 and 0.94 in terms of labor force participation in the four
regions considered, between 0.45 and 0.64 for self-employedworkers, and between 0.31 and
0.43 for employers, as we can see in Table 1.
Table 1: Gender differences in the labor market, by European region
(female to male ratios) Labor force part. Self Employed Employers
Eastern Europe 0.88 0.61 0.43
Northern Europe 0.94 0.52 0.34
Southern Europe 0.76 0.45 0.32
Western Europe 0.84 0.64 0.31
United States 0.86 0.71 0.41
The main goal of this article is to quantify the aggregate effects of the aforementioned
gender gaps on aggregate productivity and income in Europe taking into account the pres-
ence of the household sector. To do that we extend the general equilibrium occupational
choice model in Cuberes and Teignier (2016) to incorporate the household sector. In the
model, agents are endowedwith a random skill level, based onwhich they decide towork as
either employers, self-employed workers, market workers, or, in the case of women, house-
hold sector workers. An employer in this model produces the consumption good using
a span-of-control technology that combines his or her managerial skills with capital and
workers. On the other hand, a self-employed worker can produce the same consumption
1See the World Development Report 2012 (World Bank, 2012) for a comprehensive review.
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good using a similar technology - adjusted by a productivity parameter - but without hiring
any workers. Finally, women also have the possibility of producing the economy’s unique
consumption good at home.2 In the model, women are identical to men in terms of their
managerial skills but they are subject to several exogenous constraints in their labor market
choices. Aswe show below, these restrictions distort the occupational allocation and reduce
aggregate productivity and income per capita.
We calibrate themodel tomatch theUnited States data on employment status andhouse-
hold production and estimate the gender gaps for 37 European countries, as well as the
United States. Our numerical results show that the gender gaps considered here cause an
average output loss of 17.5%when only consideringmarket output and 13.2%when includ-
ing also household output. Interestingly, in amodelwithout household sector the estimated
output loss would be somewhat lower, 12%, even if the increase in household production is
not taken into account. The reason for this is that the market output loss is larger when the
household sector is taken into account, since some women choose to leave the labor force
to produce in the household sector when the gender gaps are introduced and the market
conditions get worse. When looking at the results by region, we see that Eastern Europe is
the region with lowest income fall due to gender gaps, while Southern Europe is the region
with the largest fall. Northern Europe, on the other hand, is the region with the largest
productivity fall which is due to the presence of high gender gaps in entrepreneurship.
Several articles in the literature study the relationship between gender inequality and
economic performance, like Galor andWeil (1996), Lagerlöf (2003), Greenwood et al. (2005),
Doepke and Tertilt (2009), Esteve-Volart (2009), Fernandez (2009), or Ngai and Petrongolo
(2017).3 To our knowledge, there are very few papers that quantify the macroeconomic
effects of these gender gaps in the labor market. The International Labor Organization pro-
vides some estimates of the output costs associated with labor gender gaps in the Middle
2We could certainly allow men to work in the household sector too. However, if we make the plausible
assumption that women are more productive at home than men, the main results of the paper would still
hold.
3See Cuberes and Teignier (2014) for a critical literature review of the two-directional link between gender
inequality and economic growth.
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East andNorthernAfrica butwithout proposing any specific theoreticalmodel (ILO, 2014).4
Cavalcanti and Tavares (2016) construct a growth model based on Galor and Weil (1996)
with exogenous wage discrimination against women. Hsieh et al. (2013) use a Roy model
to estimate the effect of the changing occupational allocation of white women, black men,
and black women between 1960 and 2008 on U.S. economic growth. Finally, Cuberes and
Teignier (2016) calculate themacroeconomic effects of gender inequality in the labormarket
using data from the International Labor Organization for a large sample of countries but
without taking into account the presence of the household sector.
There is also a large literature that incorporates a household sector in macroeconomic
models to understand its importance for the aggregate economy. See, amongothers, Prescott
(2004), Gollin, Parente, andRogerson (2004), Greenwood et al. (2005), Rogerson (2007, 2008),
Ngai and Pissarides (2011), Guner et al. (2012a, 2012b), Moro et al. (2017), Rendall (2017),
or Cerina et al. (2017). In terms of measuring the household sector production, some recent
contributions are Bridgman (2016), Duernecker andHerrendorf (2017), or Bridgman, Duer-
necker, and Herrendorf (2017). However, none of these papers has been used to calculate
the aggregate costs of gender inequality. Our goal in this paper is to build on Cuberes and
Teignier (2016) and add a household sector to the model in the spirit of some of the papers
just mentioned.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical
framework. We show the parameter values and the numerical results in Section 3, while
we study the effects of technology change in household durables in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we present the theoretical framework used to generate the quantitative
predictions of Section 3, which is an extension of the model proposed by Cuberes and
Teignier (2016). The details of the model solution are presented in the Appendix.
4See also the reports by Goldman Sachs (2007), Aguirre et al. (2012), and McKinsey & Company (2015).
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2.1 Setup description
The economy we consider has two sectors (market and household) that produce an ho-
mogeneous good, as well as a continuum of agents, indexed by their skill level x, who own
one unit of time. Talent here should be interpreted more broadly than in Lucas (1978) or
Cuberes and Teignier (2016) since now it not only affects the entrepreneurs’ profits, but also
the workers’ earnings.5 We assume the economy is closed, with an exogenous workforce of
size P . Skill-adjusted labor and capital are supplied by consumers to firms, in exchange for
a wage rate per unit of skill, w, and a capital rental rate, r, respectively. These inputs are
then combined by firms to produce a unique, homogeneous consumption. The stock of cap-
ital takes its steady-state value and, hence, its marginal product is equal to the depreciation
rate plus the intertemporal discount factor.
Men choose to become either firm workers in the market sector, who earn the equilib-
rium wage rate w times their skill level x, or entrepreneurs, who earn the profits gener-
ated by the firm they manage in the market sector. Women can also become workers or
entrepreneurs but they also have the option of producing in the household sector. As in
Lucas (1978) and Buera and Shin (2011), the production function of an employer is given by
y (x) = x
(
k(x)αn(x)1−α
)η
, (1)
where x denotes the talent or productivity level of the employer, n(x) is the units of skill-
adjusted labor hired by the employer, k(x) is the units of capital rented by the employer, and
y(x) represents the units of output produced. The parameter η ∈ (0, 1) measures the span
of control of entrepreneurs and, since it is smaller than one, the entrepreneurial technology
involves an element of diminishing returns. Since the price of the homogeneous good is
normalized to one, employers’ profits are equal pi (x) = y (x)− rk (x)− wn (x).
On the other hand, an agent with talent x who chooses to become self-employed in the
market sector operates a technology given by
5In what follows we will refer to an entrepreneur as someone who works as either an employer or a self-
employed.
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y˜ (x) = τx
(
k˜(x)αn˜(x)1−α
)η
, (2)
where k˜ (x) denotes the units of capital used and y˜ (x) the units of output produced. n˜(x) =
x are the skill-adjusted labor units the self-employed agents works in his or her own firm.6
The parameter τ , which is calibrated tomatch the aggregate share of self-employedworkers,
captures the fact that self-employed agents have to spend some time on management tasks.
Self-employed profits are equal to p˜i (x) = y˜ (x)− rk˜ (x).
Finally, women can also produce in the household sector, operating the following tech-
nology:
yh = (Akh +Bnh)
η , (3)
where kh denotes the units of capital rent by the household sector and nh the units of time
allocated to the household sector. Note that this production function can be seen as the per-
fect substitutes version of the one in equation (1), with the productivity parametersA andB
being independent of the agent talent. Women choose kh and nh in order to maximize their
total earnings, which are given by theirmarket-sector plus their household sector earnings.7
Specifically, when the opportunity cost of time is their market wage wx, women choose to
allocate their unit of time in the household sector when A
B
< r
wx
, and they choose to allo-
cate it to the market otherwise.8 Under this household production function, changes in the
home technology parameter A (which can be interpreted as an increase in the availability
of home appliances or the consumer durable goods revolution mentioned in Greenwood et
al., 2005) lead to a rise of female labor participation, as in the model by Greenwood et al.
(2005) which is empirically assessed by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008).
6The consumption good produced by the self-employed and the capital they use is the same as the one in
the employers’ problem. However, it is convenient to denote them y˜ and k˜ to clarify the exposition.
7Arguably this is a unitary approach to the problem in the sense that a household in thismodel is effectively
composed of only one personwho can either be aman or awoman. Amore realistic but complicated approach
would recognize the importance of intra-household decisions as in Chiappori (1997). We leave this promising
avenue for further research.
8As explained in Appendix A, depending on the parameter values, women choosing to work at homemay
still want to rent some capital because their time endowment is limited. At the same time, there may be a
group of women who allocate part of their time to the household sector and part of their time to the market
sector.
6
2.2 Frictionless Equilibrium
In equilibrium, employers choose the units of labor and capital they hire in order to
maximize their current profits , denoted by pie, while self-employed workers choose the
units of capital to rent in order to maximize their profits, denoted by pis. Market workers
earn a labor compensation equal to wx. Women also choose the units of capital to rent for
the household-sector production and the fraction of their time they want to allocate to this
sector. If they choose to become full-time household workers, they earn an income denoted
by pi00h , while if they choose to become part-time household workers, they earn an income
denoted by pi01h , which includes market-sector earnings plus household-sector earnings.
The first plot of Figure 1 displays the payoff of the three market occupations at each
talent level and shows the optimal occupational choices in equilibrium for men. Men with
the highest skill level (those with talent above z2) become employers, whereas those with
intermediate skill levels become self-employed. Finally, men with a level of talent lower
than z1 become market workers. The second plot of Figure 1 displays the slightly more
complicated occupational map for women. As it was the case for men, women with talent
above z2 become employers, whereas those with talent between z1 and z2 choose to be self-
employed. Women become market workers if their talent is between zf0 and z1. Women
with talent below zf0 allocate their time to the household sector production, either part time
(between zf00 and z
f
0 ) or full time (below z
f
0 ).9
In this economy, aggregate (market) production is the sum of output by male employers
and male self-employed, as well as output by female employers and female self-employed:
Y = N
 ∞ˆ
z2
y(x)dΓ(x) +
z2ˆ
z1
y˜(x)dΓ(x)
 ,
where Γ(x) denotes the talent cumulative density function, which, again, it is assumed to be
the same for men and women. The first term inside the bracket represents the production
9To be precise, pi00h and pi01h are defined here as the household production profits by household workers
relative to market workers, who may also choose to engage in household production but using only capital.
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Figure 1: The occupational map
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by male and female employers, whereas the second one is the corresponding term by self-
employed.
Total production in the economy, YT , is the sum of market output (Y ) and household
output, Yh.
YT = Y + Yh.
Yh is equal to household production by full-time household workers, y00h , plus household
production by part-time householdworkers, y01h , plus household production by femalemar-
ket workers, y1h (who use some capital in the household sector in order to produce there):
Yh =
N
2
 z
f
00ˆ
B
y00h dΓ(x) +
zf0ˆ
zf00
y01h (x) dΓ(x) +
∞ˆ
zf0
y1hdΓ(x)
 .
2.3 Introducing gender gaps into the framework
The model assumes that women are identical to men in terms of their innate skills but
they face exogenous constraints in their market-sector occupational choice. These frictions
may reflect discrimination, or other demand factors, but they might also reflect differences in
optimal choices of women, or other supply factors. In this sense, our estimated effects should
be interpreted as the result of all the factors that make women behave differently than men
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in the labor market.
The first constraint we impose is that females face a probability µ of being “allowed”10
to be an employer and a probability 1−µ of being excluded from employership. Out of the
group of women not allowed to be employers, some have have the possibility of becoming
self-employedwhile the rest are also excluded from self-employment. In particular, women
excluded from employership have a probability µo of being allowed to be self-employed
and a probability (1− µo) of not being allowed to be self-employed. As a result a frac-
tion (1− µ) (1− µo) of women are shut out from entrepreneurship, i.e. both employership
and self-employment, and can only become workers. Appendix B shows a graphical rep-
resentation of the occupational choice of women taking into account the constraints just
described.11 Finally, the third friction we introduce is that only a fraction λ of women are
allowed to participate in the labor market, while a fraction (1− λ) of randomly selected
women are excluded from all the possible occupations in the labor market.12 In this setup,
women who do not participate in the formal labor market become full-time workers in the
household sector and, hence, the estimated aggregate income loss due to the λ gender gap
depends on the difference between the market participants earnings and the household-
sector earnings.
The effects of the entrepreneurship gaps, µ and µo, are illustrated in Figure 2 for the
case without part-time workers. When some women are excluded from entrepreneurship,
the supply of market workers increases, leading to a fall in the wage rate and a rise in the
employers’ profit function. This makes both z1 and z2 fall, implying a lower average talent
of entrepreneurs and a lower firm productivity. The capital stock adjusts downwards to
keep its marginal product equal to the depreciation rate plus the intertemporal discount
10Again, this constraint may represent either demand barriers, supply choices, or a combination of the two.
11 Note that, in this setup, we are not allowing for the possibility of women being excluded from self-
employment but not from employership, sincewe think that whichever are the barriers women face to become
self-employed, they should apply even more strongly to become an employer. In terms of the parameters of
the model, if µ = 1, then the value of µo does not affect the occupational choices of women.
12We say that women excluded from the labor force are randomly selected because the talent of these ex-
cluded women is drawn from the same distribution as the rest of the population.
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factor. Moreover, in the case of women, there is a rise in zf0 , implying that the number of
workers in the market-sector falls and the number of workers in the household sector rises.
As a result of all these effects, market-sector output decreases. If part-time work was also
considered, the fall in wages would lead to a rise of both zf00 and z
f
0 , implying also a fall in
female market work.
Figure 2: Qualitative effects of entrepreneurship gender gaps
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The effects of the labor force participation gap, λ, are more straightforward. When some
women get excluded from the market sector, they become household-sector workers, lead-
ing to a fall in the market-sector labor and a rise in the home-sector labor. As before, the
capital stock adjusts downwards to keep its marginal product equal to the depreciation
rate plus the intertemporal discount factor. These effects clearly reduce total output from
the market sector, but they are likely to slightly increase output per worker because the
household-sector capital demand falls and, thus, the market sector capital-to-labor ratio
increases.
3 Numerical results
3.1 Talent Distribution and Model Parametrization
To simulate the model, we use a Pareto function for the talent distribution, as in Lucas
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Table 2: Common parameter values
Parameter Value Explanation
B 1 Normalization
η 0.79 From Buera and Shin (2011)
α 0.114 To match capital share: αη + (1− η) = 0.3
ρ 6.3 To match the U.S. employer’s share
τ 0.67 To match the U.S. self-employed share
A 0.14 To match the value of household output
B 0.86 To match the share of female part-time workers
(1978) and Buera et al. (2011). The cumulative distribution of talent is, hence, given by
Γ (x) = 1−Bρx−ρ, x ≥ 0, (4)
where ρ, B > 0.
The values used for themodel parameters are showed in Table 2. The parameterB of the
talent distribution is normalized to 1, while the parameter η is set to 0.79 as in Buera and Shin
(2011).13 The capital-output elasticity parameter α is set to 0.114 in order to match the 30%
capital income share observed in the U.S. data.14 The parameters (ρ, τ, A, B) are estimated
to match four different moments of the United States data. First, the fraction of employers
in the labor force (which is 3.6%), second, the fraction of self-employed workers in the labor
force (which is 6.5%), third, the household sector output relative to the market-sector one
(which is 0.3), and, fourth, the gap between the share of female part-time workers and the
share of male part-time workers (which is 10.6%). Data on employment status and working
hours is obtained from the International Labour Organization, while data on household-
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sector output is obtained from Bridgman et al (2017).
The values of the country-specific gender gaps (µ, µo, λ) are computed to simultaneously
match the female-to-male ratio of employers, self-employed workers, and labor market par-
ticipation in each country. After matching these moments, we obtain that the average value
of the employership gender gap, 1−µ, is 0.59, while the highest value is 0.78 and the lowest
value is 0.38. For the self-employment gender gap, (1− µ) (1− µo), the average value is is
0.45, the maximum is 0.68, and the minimum 0.08. Finally, for the labor force gender gap,
1− λ, the average value is 0.15, the maximum is 0.46, and the minimum is 0.
3.2 Numerical results for European countries
The numerical results for the sample of 37 European countries, together with the United
States, are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. Appendix C contains the results for all countries.
As we can see in Table 3, the average fall in total output (market plus household) is similar
in the baseline simulation (13.2%) and in the simulation with no household sector (12%).
The rise in hosehold sector production (5% in the baseline simulation) does not compensate
for the fact that the fall inmarket output is much larger in the baseline simulation (17.5% vs.
12%). At the same time, the fall in female market sector hours is significantly larger in the
baseline simulation than the in the simulation with no household sector (24.2% vs 14.6%),
about half of which is due to entrepreneurship gender gaps in the case of the baseline sim-
ulation.
Intuitively, in the baseline simulation, the introduction of the gender gaps leads to an
increase in the household sector output (5%), which obviously does not occur in the model
without household sector, as we can see in thethird rows of Table 3. At the same time,
however, themarket output loss due to the gaps is larger in the baseline simulation, since the
fall in market output due to the entrepreneurship gender gaps in the baseline simulation is
13Buera and Shin (2011) choose η to match the top five percent income share in the U.S., which is 30%. This
is a reasonable approximation given that the top earners are entrepreneurs both in the model and the U.S.
data.
14 Entrepreneurs’ profits are considered capital income, thus we set αη + (1− η) equal to 30%.
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Table 3: Average losses due to the gender gaps in Europe and the United States
(%) Baseline simulation No household sector
Fall in market output
due to entrepreneurship gaps 12.6 5.5
Fall in market output
due to all gender gaps 17.5 12.0
Fall in household output
due to all gender gaps -5.0 0
Fall in total output
due to all gender gaps 13.2 12.0
Fall in female mkt hours
due to entrepreneurship gaps 12.0 0
Fall in female mkt hours
due to all gender gaps 24.2 14.6
more than twice the one in the simulationwithout household sector (12.6% vs. 5.5%), as the
first row of Table 3 shows. The reason is that, in the presence of a household sector, female
labor supply endogenously falls after the introduction of the entrepreneurship gender gaps,
as the fifth row of Table 3 shows. When faced with these barriers, a substantial number of
women, some of them with high levels of talent, change occupations and, some, end up in
the household sector. This then results in less able men managing firms, hence, generating
a drag in the economy’s productivity.
Table 4 shows the average results by region: Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern
Europe, and Western Europe, plus the United States for comparison purposes.15 In the last
column, we can see the lost in total output (market plus household) due to all the gender
gaps considered, which is highest in Southern Europe (with 15.9%) and lowest in Eastern
Europe (11.3%). The third column shows that rise in household-sector production. In the
first two columns, we can see the effects of the gender gaps onmarket output perworker and
market output per capita. The fall in market productivity (or market output per worker),
15Eastern Europe is composed of Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Northern Europe is composed of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ire-
land, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Southern Europe is composed of Croatia,
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Malta, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, and Spain. Western Europe is composed
of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Switzerland.
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Table 4: Losses due to the gender gaps, by European region
(%) Market output
per worker
Market output Household
output
Total output
Eastern Europe 5.5 15.1 -4.8 11.3
Northern Europe 7.5 16.3 -5.4 12.1
Southern Europe 5.7 20.6 -3.8 15.9
Western Europe 6.6 18.4 -6.6 13.6
United States 6.3 17.3 -6.5 12.7
which is mainly due to the entrepreneurship gender gaps, is highest in Northern Europe,
followed by Western Europe, and is lowest in in Eastern Europe. This is contrast with the
fall in total market output, which is highest in Southern Europe, indicating that the labor
force participation gap is higher than in other regions. In conclusion, the lowest falls due
to gender gaps are in Eastern Europe, while Northern Europe (and Western Europe, to a
smaller extent) has a larger fall in productivity but a smaller fall in total market output and
Southern Europe has a smaller fall in productivity but a larger fall in total market output.
TheUnited States has productivity losses comparable toWestern Europe andmarket output
losses comparable to Northern Europe.
3.3 Decomposition of the results
In this section we decompose the losses of market output into the three components of
the production function. The first component, firm productivity, depends on the talent of
employers and self-employed when capital and labor are kept constant. As explained in
Section 2.3, the presence of the entrepreneurship gender gaps leads to a fall in the average
talent of firm managers because less talented individuals replace those excluded by the
gender gaps. The second component, the equilibrium capital stock, is negatively affected
by introduction of gender gaps because both the fall in employment and the fall in firm
productivity lead to a fall in the marginal product of capital. Finally, the third component,
the equilibrium labor, is also negatively affected by the introduction of gender gaps, not
only because of the direct effect of the λ-gap, but also because of the endogenous fall in the
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female labor supply due to a market productivity drop.
The first three columns of Table 5 show the importance of each component for the four
European regions as well as the United States. The contribution of firm productivity fall
into themarket output loss due gender gaps ranges from 23.2% in Southern Europe to 35.1%
in Northern Europe. The contribution of the capital stock fall into the market output loss
ranges from 5.7% in Northern Europe to 6.5% in Southern Europe, while the contribution
of the labor input fall ranges from 59.3% in Northern Europe to 70.2% in Southern Europe.
In conclusion, about two thirds of the market output loss is due the fall in the labor input,
about one fourth is due to the fall in firm productivity, and the rest is due to the capital
input fall.
Following Antunes et al. (2015), we next decompose the fall in output per worker into a
TFP term and a capital intensity, term. Mathematically, if aggregate output per worker can
bewritten as y = TFP×kα, then it must be also be the case that y = TFP 11−α
(
k
y
) α
1−α
,where
k
y
is the capital-output ratio or capital intensity. The contribution of the capital intensity
term is showed in column 4 of Table 5, and it corresponds approximately to one fourth of
the fall in output per worker. The TFP term, on the other hand, explains about three fourth
of the output per worker fall, as is showed in column 5 of Table 5. The contribution of the
capital intensity term ranges from 18.2% in Northern Europe to 39.5% in Southern Europe,
while the contribution of the TFP term ranges from 60.5% in Southern Europe to 81.8% in
Northern Europe.
4 Extension: Effects of the “Engines of Liberation”
As discussed in Greenwood et al. (2005) and Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008), an impor-
tant driver behind the secular rise in female labor supply is the introduction of household
durable goods. This phenomenon was labeled as “engines of liberation” by Greenwood et
al. (2005) and tested empirically by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008). In this extension, we ex-
amine the effects of a 5% increase in the parameterA from equation 3, which corresponds to
the productivity of capital in the household production function. We first look at the effects
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Table 5: Fraction of the loss due to each component, by European region
(%) Market output Output perworker
Firm pro-
ductivity
Capital
input
Labor input Capital
intensity
TFP
Eastern Europe 28.9 5.9 65.2 24.0 75.6
Northern Europe 35.1 5.7 59.3 18.2 81.8
Southern Europe 23.2 6.5 70.2 39.5 60.5
Western Europe 27.7 6.1 66.2 26.0 74.0
United States 27.7 6.0 66.3 24.7 75.3
on femalemarket labor hours by European regionwhen only the entrepreneurship gaps are
present, when only the labor force participation gap is present, and when all gender gaps
are present. Next, we study the output losses due to the introduction of the gender gaps
under the new value of A.
The first three columns of Table 6 show that a 5% rise in A leads to a rise of more than
11% in the market hours of women. Intuitively, when A increases, more women find it
optimal to increase their market participation and use more durables to produce in the
household sector. This increase in female employment, however, would be much lower if
the entrepreneurship gender gaps were not present, as we can see in column 3. When the
entrepreneurship gender gaps are present, more women optimally decide to work in the
household sector because the labor market wages are lower and, some of these women,
reallocate to the market sector after the rise in A.
The last four columns of Table 6 show the output effects of introducing the gender gaps
when A has increased by 5%. Comparing these columns with Table 4, we can see that the
effects onmarket output are now smaller, since less women decide to leave themarket labor
force. The increase in household output due to the gender gaps is now also smaller, since
women working in the market sector are now available to produce more at the household
using only capital. The fall in total output (market plus household) is now also smaller, due
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Table 6: Effects of a 5% increase in the parameter A, by European region
(%) Rise in femalelabor hours
Output losses
due to gender
gaps
All gaps
Entrepr.
gaps
LFP gaps
Market
output
Household
output
Total
output
Eastern Europe 11.3 11.0 2.41 10.8 -1.36 8.1
Northern Europe 11.1 10.9 2.39 11.8 -1.36 8.9
Southern Europe 11.9 11.2 2.47 16.8 -0.50 12.9
Western Europe 11.6 11.0 2.43 14.2 -1.32 10.8
United States 11.6 11.1 2.42 12.9 -1.6 9.72
to the smaller drop in market output.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses a general equilibrium, occupational choice model with a household sec-
tor to examine the quantitative effects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and workforce
participation. The introduction of the household sector increases the estimated loss in mar-
ket output, but it decreases the estimated loss in household output. Our simulations also
show that gender gaps in entrepreneurship have very large negative effects in both income
and aggregate productivity, since they reduce the entrepreneurs’ average talent as well as
female labor force participation when we consider the possibility of working in the house-
hold sector. We then estimate the gender gaps for 37 European countries and we find that
gender gaps cause an average market output loss of 17.5%, with Southern Europe being the
region with the largest loss. About two thirds of the market output loss is due the fall in
the labor input, about one fourth is due to the fall in firm productivity, and the rest is due
to the capital input fall. The loss in total output, which also includes household production
is 13%, slightly larger than the one predicted in a model without household sector. A rise
in the household capital productivity has important effects on the equilibrium, leading to
more female employment and lower income losses due to gender gaps, but we show that
17
this effect depends crucially on the gender gaps present in the economy. These results high-
light the importance of accounting for household production inmodels that aim to quantify
the effects of gender gaps in the labor market.
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A Model details
A.1 Agents’ optimization
A.1.1 Employers
Employers choose the units of labor and capital they hire in order to maximize their
current profits pi.
max
k,n
{
x
(
kαn1−α
)η − rk − wn} ,
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The optimal number of workers and capital stock, n(x) and k(x) respectively, depend posi-
tively on the productivity level x, as equations (5) and (6) show:
n (x) =
[
xη(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
]1/(1−η)
, (5)
k (x) =
[
xηα
(
1− α
α
)η(1−α)
rη(1−α)−1
wη(1−α)
]1/(1−η)
. (6)
A.1.2 Self-employed
When we solve for the problem of a self-employed agent with talent x who wishes to
maximize his or her profits,
max
k
{xk(x)αη − rk} ,
we find
k˜(x) =
(τxαη
r
) 1
1−αη
. (7)
A.1.3 Household production
Women can get extra earnings fromhousehold production, hence they choose the house-
hold units of capital kh and labor nh in order to maximize their total earnings, which are
given by their market-sector plus their household sector earnings. Specifically, when their
optimal occupational choice in the market is to become a worker, their optimization prob-
lem is
max
kh,nh
{(Akh +Bnh)η + wx (1− nh)} ,
with nh ∈ [0, 1] and kh ≥ 0.16 As a result, when AB > rwx , women choose to allocate all
their time to the market sector and rent k1h ≡
(
ηAη
r
) 1
1−ηunits of capital. When A
B
< r
wx
, on the
16Note that if a woman is an employer or a self-employed, it will never be optimal for her to spend some
time in household production.
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other hand,women allocate at least part of their time endowment to the household sector. In
particular, their optimal time allocation to the household sector is n0h ≡ min
{
1,
(
ηBη
wx
) 1
1−η
}
,
which implies that somewomenwith highmarket productivity may choose to allocate part
of their time to the household sector and part of their time to the market sector. Women
supplying all their labor to the market sector choose to rent k0h≡ max
{
0,
(
ηAη
r
) 1
1−η − B
A
}
units of capital.
In other words, when rB1−η
ηA
< 1, women choose their labor allocation as follows:
nh =

0 if x > B
A
r
w
1 otherwise
(8)
and their units of capital used in the household sector are equal to
kh =

(
ηAη
r
) 1
1−η if x > B
A
r
w(
ηAη
r
) 1
1−η − B
A
otherwise
, (9)
producing the following units of output:
yh =
(
ηA
r
) η
1−η
(10)
in both cases.
On the other hand, when , when rB1−η
ηA
> 1, women choose their labor allocation as
follows:
nh =

0 if x > B
A
r
w(
ηBη
wx
) 1
1−η if ηBη
w
< x < B
A
r
w
1 if x < ηBη
w
(11)
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and their units of capital used in the household sector are equal to
kh =

(
ηAη
r
) 1
1−η if x > B
A
r
w
0 otherwise
(12)
producing the following units of output:
yh =

(
ηA
r
) η
1−η if x > B
A
r
w(
ηB
wx
) η
1−η if ηBη
w
< x < B
A
r
w
Bη if x < ηBη
w
. (13)
A.1.4 Occupational choice
Figure (1) displays the shape of the profit functions of employers (pie(x)) and self-employed
(pis(x)) along with wage function earned by employees and the female household workers
extra earning as a function of talent x.17 The figure also shows the relevant talent cutoffs
for the occupational choices. Here we present the equations that define the three thresh-
olds. The threshold, z1, determines the earnings such that agents are indifferent between
becoming workers or self-employed and it is given by
wz1 = τz1k˜ (z1)
αη − rk˜ (z1) . (14)
If x ≤ z1 agents choose to become workers, while if x > z1 they become self-employed
or employers. The cutoff, z2, on the other hand, determines the choice between being a
self-employed or an employer and it is given by
τz2k˜(z2)
αη − rk˜(z2) = z2x
(
k(z2)
αn(z2)
1−α)η − rk (z2)− wn(z2) (15)
17In order to construct this figure we are implicitly using parameter values such all occupations are chosen
in equilibrium and that part-time work is not optimal.
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so that if x > z2 an agent wants to become an employer.
Finally, the cutoff zf0 , defines the talent level at which women are indifferent between
being household workers, who only get earnings from their household production, and
market workers, who get wage income plus household income from the household cap-
ital production. Specifically, when rB1−η
ηA
< 1, household workers get earnings
(
ηA
r
) η
1−η −
r
((
ηAη
r
) 1
1−η − B
A
)
, while market workers get their wage income plus household earnings
equal to
(
ηA
r
) η
1−η − r (ηAη
r
) 1
1−η . Hence, the difference between the household sector earnings
is equal to rB
A
and the talent threshold zf0 is defined as
r
B
A
= wzf0 . (16)
Therefore, if their talent is below zf0 , womenmaximize their earnings as householdworkers,
while above zf0 their earnings are maximized as market workers.
When rB1−η
ηA
> 1, on the other hand, there are some women working full time in the
household sector, some working part-time in the household sector and part-time in the
market sector, and some other women working full time in the market sector. Women with
ability below zf00, where z
f
00 ≡ ηB
η
w
, choose towork full time in the household sector, and earn
Bη. Women with ability between zf00 and z
f
0 , where z
f
0 is defined in equation (16), choose
to allocate part of their time to the market and part of their time to the household. Their
total earnings are
(
ηB
wx
) η
1−η from the household production plus wx
(
1− (ηBη
wx
) 1
1−η
)
from the
market sector, compared to total earnings of wx+
(
ηA
r
) η
1−η − r (ηAη
r
) 1
1−η by female workers.
When rB1−η
ηA
> 1 women have actually five occupational choices, since some choose to
work part time in the market and part time in the household sector. In this case, the earning
functions are defined as
pi00h ≡ Bη − (1− η)
(
ηA
r
) η
1−η
and
pi01h ≡ wx+ (1− η)
((
ηB
wx
) η
1−η
−
(
ηA
r
) η
1−η
)
,
which correspond to the household workers earnings minus the household production
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earnings of female market workers.
A.2 Competitive Equilibrium in a model with household sector
We assume that women represent half of the population in the economy and that there
is no unemployment. Moreover, any agent in the economy can potentially participate in the
labor market, except for the restrictions on women described above. Under these assump-
tions, in equilibrium, the total demand of capital by employers and self-employed must be
equal to the aggregate capital endowment (in per capita terms), k:
k =
1
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
k(x)dΓ(x) +
z2ˆ
z1
k˜(x)dΓ(x)

+
λ
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
µk(x)dΓ(x) +
z2ˆ
z1
(µ+ (1− µ)µ0) k˜(x)dΓ(x) +
∞ˆ
z2
(1− µ)µ0k˜(x)dΓ(x)
 (17)
+
λ
2

zf0ˆ
B
k0hdΓ(x) +
∞ˆ
zf0
k1hdΓ(x)
+ 1− λ2
∞ˆ
zf0
k0hdΓ(x).
The first line of equation (17) is the demand for capital bymen, while the two lower lines
are the women’s demand for capital. The demand for capital by male-run firms has two
components: the first one represents the capital demand by employers, while the second
represents the demand by self-employed.
The demand of capital by women has six components, the first three corresponding to
the market-sector firms run by women and the last three corresponding to the household-
sector capital. The first one represents the capital demand by female employers, i.e. those
with enough ability to be employers and who are allowed to be so, while the second term
represent the capital demand bywomenwho have the right ability to be self-employed. The
third term shows the capital demand by women who become self-employed because they
are excluded from employership. The fourth term corresponds to the household-sector
capital demand by women who choose to be household-sector workers, the fifth is the
household-sector capital demanded by women supplying the entire labor supply to the
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market sector, and the last term is the household-sector capital demand by women who
work in the household-sector because they are not allowed to work in the market sector.
Similarly, the labor market-clearing condition is given by
1
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
n(x)dΓ(x)
+ λ
2
 ∞ˆ
z2
µ (x)n(x)dΓ(x)
 =
1
2
z1ˆ
B
xdΓ(x) +
λ
2

z1ˆ
zf0
xdΓ(x) +
∞ˆ
z1
((1− µ) (1− µ0))xdΓ(x) +
zf0ˆ
B
x
(
1− n0h (x)
)
dΓ(x)
 ,
where the first line represents the skill-adjusted aggregate labor demand and the second
line represents the skill-adjusted aggregate labor supply in themarket sector. The aggregate
labor demand is equal to the male employers demand (first term) and the female employ-
ers demand (second term), i.e. those women with enough ability to be employers who are
allowed to choose their occupation freely. The aggregate labor supply is equal to the male
workers supply (first term in second line) plus the female workers supply (second, third,
and fourth term in second line). The female workers supply is given by the skill-adjusted
labor of women who, given their talent, choose to be full-time workers, plus that of women
who have enough ability to be employers or self-employed but are excluded from both oc-
cupations. Finally, some women working in the household sector may also choose to be
part-time workers in the market sector.
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of cutoff levels (zf00, z
f
0 , z1, z2), a set
of quantities
[
n (x) , n0h (x) , k (x) , k˜ (x) , k
0
h, k
1
h
]
,∀x, and prices (w, r) such that entrepreneurs
choose the amount of capital and labor to maximize their profits, and labor and capital
markets clear.
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B Women occupational choice map
(, ∞)
Cannot be 
employers

Can be either 
employers or 
self-employed
1 − 
1 − 



Cannot be self-
employed
Become workers
Can be self-
employed
Become self-
employed
(, ∞)
Become 
employers
(, )
Become self-
employed
Market 
participants(
, ∞)
Household 
workers
(, 
)
(
, )
Become workers
C Country-by-country results: long run income losses from
labor market gender gaps
%
Baseline simulation No household sector simulation
Loss in Y/N
due to all
gender gaps
Loss in Y/P
due to all
gender. gaps
Loss in Total
Y/P due to
all gaps
Loss in Y/N
due to all
gender gaps
Loss in Y/P
due to all
gender. gaps
Loss in Total
Y/P due to
all gaps
Austria 6.41 17.38 12.77 5.11 11.75 11.75
Belarus 6.40 11.94 9.12 4.97 5.62 5.62
Belgium 7.31 20.09 14.82 5.91 13.83 13.83
Bulgaria 5.88 15.12 11.09 4.61 9.75 9.75
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Croatia 5.08 16.27 11.96 4.01 11.88 11.88
Cyprus 8.99 19.85 14.58 7.33 11.65 11.65
Czech Republic 6.28 21.70 16.39 5.08 16.74 16.74
Denmark 7.89 18.14 13.34 6.33 10.92 10.92
Estonia 9.06 16.53 12.51 7.29 7.63 7.63
Finland 7.28 15.66 11.60 5.76 8.78 8.78
France 7.40 17.18 12.64 5.90 10.39 10.39
Germany 6.75 18.09 13.30 5.39 12.17 12.17
Greece 5.26 22.70 17.63 4.28 18.82 18.82
Hungary 5.96 16.95 12.46 4.71 11.72 11.72
Iceland 7.21 16.14 11.91 5.72 9.42 9.42
Ireland 7.80 19.28 14.16 6.26 12.34 12.34
Italy 5.33 23.23 18.13 4.34 19.34 19.34
Latvia 6.07 10.77 8.35 4.69 4.69 4.69
Lithuania 7.28 12.96 9.97 5.72 5.72 5.72
Luxembourg 5.49 20.01 15.04 4.42 15.62 15.62
Macedonia 4.54 23.33 18.52 3.69 20.13 20.13
Malta 5.18 29.42 24.99 4.37 26.37 26.37
Moldova 5.95 11.41 8.68 4.60 5.54 5.54
Netherlands 6.79 18.01 13.23 5.42 12.03 12.03
Norway 7.23 16.91 12.44 5.73 10.27 10.27
Poland 4.68 17.25 12.80 3.69 13.34 13.34
Portugal 6.42 15.45 11.37 5.07 9.54 9.54
Romania 6.13 18.73 13.85 4.88 13.53 13.53
Russian Federation 4.36 9.34 7.01 3.34 5.09 5.09
Serbia 4.72 20.55 15.73 3.77 16.92 16.92
Slovakia 5.67 19.15 14.26 4.51 14.45 14.45
Slovenia 6.33 17.71 13.02 5.02 12.16 12.16
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Spain 5.35 17.63 13.04 4.23 13.11 13.11
Sweden 8.01 18.53 13.61 6.43 11.24 11.24
Switzerland 6.22 18.11 13.34 4.98 12.78 12.78
Ukraine 4.00 9.52 7.03 3.08 5.68 5.68
United Kingdom 6.89 17.89 13.15 5.48 11.77 11.77
United States 6.31 17.26 12.68 5.01 11.70 11.70
30
